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Abstract 
 
Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) have been shown to be efficient for the numerical 
evaluation of the reliability of complex systems.  They achieve exact results where 
Fault Tree Analysis could generally produce only bounds.  In this paper the approach 
to systems evaluation using a Bayesian method in conjunction with BDDs is explored.  
The advantages of the approach are discussed with respect to both efficiency and the 
ability to deal with dependency within the system in a natural manner.  As an 
illustration a simple pump configuration is considered which features a dependency.  
The results demonstrate both the flexibility of the approach and the ease of dealing 
with the additional complexity of dependency. 
 
Introduction 
 
The use of Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) have many advantages for the analysis 
of complex reliability structures over Fault Tree Analysis, see Andrews (2001) and 
Beeson and Andrews (2003).  In section two there is a brief review of the major 
features of BDDs.  A particular strength of using a BDD is the estimation of the 
failure probability of a system since BDDs provide exact calculation methods whereas 
in the past Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) has generally only allowed bounds.  Another 
aspect of the BDD is its ability to explore dependency within the system such as that 
existing due to standby redundancy. 
 
This paper explores the use of the BDD model in a Bayesian evaluation of the system.  
Whilst there are many issues to address, the main aspect will be the approach to the 
analysis of a system’s reliability on the assumption that there already exists data on 
the specific component’s failure times and elicited information on prior beliefs about 
these elements.  The third section of the paper will explore the general concepts.  
These will include the use of BDDs to explore dependency within the system, both at 
a component level but also through the data. 
 
To provide greater insight into the approach taken a simple example will be 
considered of a pump system with associated pressure relief valves.  Obviously some 
will appreciate that the model chosen has resonance within safety critical systems.  It 
will be assumed that information regarding the failure time distribution for the valves 
used is well established but that there is relatively little known about the pumps 
involved.  The specific system will be described along with the data available for 
analysis.  
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The data and system structure will be then used to run a series of experiments.  This 
will illustrate how we can use the model dynamically to provide insight into the 
context of the dependency.  The last section will provide a summary of results and 
discussion of further research. 
 
Modelling of Systems Reliability Using BDD 
 
Fault tree analysis is frequently employed to study the performance of systems, 
especially safety critical systems, see Henley and Kumamoto (1981).  An acyclic 
graph is derived to describe the relationship between a specific failure mode for the 
system and the constituent elements of the system.  Figure 1 presents a diagram, 
which will be subsequently used in the example. 
 
 
Figure 1 Fault Tree of Pump System 
 
In Figure 1 the top event is connected to intermediate gate events, G1 and G2 by an 
AND gate, gate A. G1 is connected to P1 and V1 by an OR gate, gate B, and G2 is 
connected to P2 and V2 by an OR gate, gate C.  The logic equation for the system is 
     
TOP = (P1 ∪ V1) ∩(P2 ∪V2)    (1) 
 
The Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) is an alternative representation of the fault tree 
structure for the top event logic function.  It uses Shannon’s description of the system 
behaviour in terms of a structure function φ(x) where x represents a vector of 
component states.  φ(x) takes the value 0 if system works and 1 if systems is failed, 
and x comprises component state indicator variables xi with the component working 
(0) or failed (1).  The BDD represents the failure logic of the system and is usually 
derived by conversion from the fault tree.  The basic events are put in an ordering.  
The BDD is based on an if-then-else, ite, architecture, so every basic node will be 
represented as X = ite(X,1,0). 
For each gate with inputs J = ite(X,f1,f2) and H = ite(Y,g1,g2) then: 
 
  If X < Y J ⊕ H = ite(X, f1 ⊕ H, f2 ⊕ H);   (2)  
 
TOP 
G1 G2 
P1 V1 V2 P2 
B 
A 
C 
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If X = Y J ⊕ H = ite (X, f1 ⊕ g1, f2 ⊕ g2)   (3) 
 
where ⊕ is the logic gate (AND/OR).  The outcome of the conversion of the fault tree 
shown in Figure 1 is presented in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: BDD for Fault Tree in Figure 1 
 
Each path through the BDD from root vertex to a terminal 1 node represents a system 
failure mode and so represents a cut set.  The set of cuts sets can be obtained by 
tracing each path through the BDD, which ends in a failure node.  Obviously of most 
interest is the minimum cut set, the minimum set of component failures that will lead 
to the failure of the system.  Rauzy (1993) produced an algorithm to derive the 
minimum cut sets from the BDD.  For the system represented in Figures 1 and 2 the 
minimum cut sets are: {P1,P2}, {P1,V2}, {V1,V2} and {V1,P2}.  In conventional fault 
tree analysis, the minimum cut sets can be used to derive the probability of system 
failure given the basic event failure probabilities. 
 
The main advantage of the BDD is however that the system failure probability can be 
obtained without the need to evaluate the minimal cut sets.  It can be obtained directly 
from the disjoint paths which yield a failed system state.  Each disjoint path leading to 
system failure considers the set of events that lead to a terminal one state and include 
both working and failed component conditions.  Since these are disjoint the system 
failure probability is obtained by summing the likelihood of each disjoint path on the 
BDD.  For the BDD shown in figure 2 the four disjoint paths are: 
 
1 0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
P1 
P2 
v2 
V1 
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2.2.1.1        4
2.1.1        3
2.2.1        2
2.1         1
VPVP
PVP
VPP
PP
 
 
The system failure probability, Qsys is then given by: 
 
 
221121122121 )1()1(.)1()1( VPVPVVPVPPPPSYS qqqqqqqqqqqqQ −−+−+−+=            (4) 
 
For a small example such as this the system reliability expression can be checked by 
use of the inclusion-exclusion expansion, Henley and Kumamoto (1981).   
 
  Qsys = Σi P(Ci) - Σij P(Ci ∩ Cj) + Σijk P(Ci ∩ Cj ∩ Ck) - ...    
 
where Ci for i=1, ..., n is the minimum cut sets.  The form for Qsys for system given 
earlier would be 
 
Qsys = P{P1.P2} +P{P1.V2} + P{V1.V2} +P{V1.P2} – P{P1.P2.V2} –P{P1.P2.V1} – (5) 
P{P1.V1.V2}-P{P2.V1.V2}+P{P1.P2.V1.V2} 
 
 
General Concepts of Bayesian Analysis using BDDs 
 
A brief description of the BDD was given in the previous section, in this section the 
aim is to discuss the use of BDDs in the context of a Bayesian Analysis.  The specific 
goal that will be undertaken is the estimation of the reliability of the overall system 
based on the assumption that the model of the system is correct and that information 
about the components, in the form of prior beliefs about their performance and data 
on their performance, is available.  Obviously it is possible to consider a more general 
problem which might be to predict the reliability of the system without assuming the 
model of system is correct.  However, this is regarded simply as an extension of the 
current model considering all possible combinations of the components. 
 
The objective of the study is to ascertain the reliability of the system given the 
information about the components.  This can be immediately interpreted in terms of 
the structure function, φ(x), as EX[φ(x)].  This means that there is a natural 
interpretation of the reliability in terms of the BDD. 
 
Therefore using the BDD will provide a mechanism for evaluating the system 
reliability distribution.  The speed of calculation offered by the  BDD makes it an 
efficient way to assess the reliability and the methodology can be easily extended to 
include dependencies.  Given the representation, in terms of the ite structure, it is 
rapid to implement a Bayesian methodology.  The computational efficiency in using 
Monte Carlo Markov Chain based techniques is clear, see Gilks et al (1996). 
 
Dependency within the system arises from structural aspects, interaction between 
components, and from the component failure time data used.   In the case of structural 
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dependency, the design and operation of the system means that there are interactions 
between  component failures, for example a piece of equipment might be in cold 
standby and so will only be used if other equipment fails to operate.  Since the 
standby element will be assumed perfectly reliable whilst in backup mode it only has 
a non-zero failure probability if the primary component fails.  Hence the dependency 
between the components where failure of one will influence the likelihood of failure 
of another component.  Other causes of dependency  may be the increase in strain or 
stress resulting from the primary failure event.  This type of dependency would, of 
course, need modelling of the specific form of dependency and is currently outside the 
scope of this paper.  Finally the data used for analysis can lead to dependency.  Often 
data in reliability studies is pooled assuming homogeneity to provide better estimates 
of the performance.  This may not be appropriate and may lead to an underestimate or 
an overestimate of performance. 
 
Pumping System 
 
The fault tree and the BDD for the pumping system were introduced in earlier 
sections.  A little further information is required about the system, and how 
dependencies can exist in the system.  Flow is normally through stream 1 that 
includes pump, P1, and over-pressure protection valve, V1.  If either P1 or V1 fail, the 
flow is switched to stream 2 comprising of duplicate components P2 in cold standby 
(cannot fail when not operational) and over-pressure valve V2.  The failure of 
components P1, V1 and V2 are independent.  The potential failure of P2, though, only 
can occur if the flow is switched to stream 2, when either P1 or V1 have failed.  Hence 
failure of P2 is conditional on P1 or V1 failure.   The system has been analysed on the 
basis of both independence (hot standby) and dependency (cold standby) for P2. 
From equation 4 it is possible to derive the expression for Qsys as  
 
Qsys = [qp2|x + (1 – qp2|x )qv2][1 – (1- qv1)(1- qp1)],   (6)  
 
Where qp1, qv1 and qp2 are the failure probabilities of P1, V1 and V2 respectively and 
qp2|x is the failure probability of P2 conditional on either P1 or V1 failing. 
  
The focus of the analysis will be on the impact the pumps have on the overall 
reliability estimate and it will be assumed that sufficient is known about the valves 
that there is no uncertainty about the lifetime distribution.  The data is obtained from 
water pumps at two different sites and the data are presented in Table 1. 
 
Site Time Between Failures (days) 
 1 131,9,1,33,39,23,99,36,51,350,2,28,105 
 2 1,6,1,1,1,2,2,2,3,1,2,4,3,1,2,3,3,2,2,4,4,5,4,3,7,1,5,4,5,6,4,
3,4,12,4,3,16,5,11,2,6,2,6,22,106,17,121,63,115,43,96 
 
Table 1 Pump Data 
   
It is assumed that the failure times for the pumps are given by the two-parameter 
Weibull distribution.  Hence there are two parameters to estimate the scale (λ) and the 
shape (β).  The Weibull plots of the data are presented in Figure 3.  The limited 
amount of data available for Site 1 is possibly insufficient to judge whether the 
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underlying population is Weibull or not.  For Site 2 it appears more likely that the 
data is from a Weibull distribution. 
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Figure 3 Weibull Plots for the two Sites 
 
Analysis 
 
The aim of the analysis is to demonstrate the use of the BDD to estimate the reliability 
of the system using a Bayesian methodology.  Obviously the aim is not to carry out a 
full Bayesian analysis but illustrate those parts where the BDD can be used effectively 
in assessing the reliability.  For this purpose it was decided to use gamma priors for 
the Weibull, since there is a requirement for the parameters to be positive.  It is also 
the case that it was decided to use the same priors for both Sites and for the 
combination. 
 
The priors selected for both λ and β are gamma (1.0,10-3) .  This could be regarded as 
unrealistic but for the purpose of the study is adequate.  It is assumed in the analysis 
as indicated before that the valves have the same failure time distribution, also a 
Weibull with λ = 0.005 and β = 1.5. 
 
It was decided to explore the estimates achieved from each site and assuming the data 
from sites were homogeneous.   This will show the effect of the site data on the 
analysis.  The posterior distributions are summarised and drawn in Figures 4, 5 and 6 
for Site 1 Pump, Site 2 Pump and Combined Site 1 and 2 Pump.  
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Figure 4 Analysis for Site 1 
 
The exploration of the effect of dependency was studied by considering whether the 
pump, P2, was on hot or cold standby.  It is assumed in this case that hot standby 
represents case of independence and cold standby illustrates structural dependency in 
the system.  Figure 7 provides the graph of the mean reliabilities over 100 days.  
Clearly, as expected, there is an ordering of the results with the Reliability for Site 1 
higher than the Combined Site reliability which is higher than the Site 2 failure 
probability.  Also Cold standby will produce a higher mean than hot standby in this 
context where there is no assumption of starting difficulties.  
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Summary and Discussion 
 
The objective of this paper is to illustrate the use of the BDD to estimate the reliability 
of systems using Bayesian methods.  The approach taken shows that such an analysis 
can be carried out effectively for very small system examples.  Obviously scaling the 
system up will encounter the difficulties found with any systems analysis.  However the 
utilisation of the BDD should facilitate the scale-up to systems of greater complexity. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Analysis for Site 2 
 
 
Figure 6 Analysis for Combined Site 
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Obviously in this paper only structural and data dependency has been considered.  As 
stated earlier if other forms of dependency are pursued then both the form and the 
nature of estimation will have to be explored.  It is likely, though, they could be 
effectively implemented using BDD approach. 
  
 
Figure 7 Mean Reliabilities over 100 days for hot and cold standby for Site 1, Site 2 
and Combined Sites. 
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